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Basics Project
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Constitutional Literacy |
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United States Constitution |
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Section 1
All legislative Powers herein granted shall be vested in a Congress of the
United States, which shall consist of a Senate and House of Representatives. |
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History |
The Model Parliament (1295)
King Edward I summoned what became known as the “Model Parliament”
because it served as the model for all succeeding Parliaments. Here, for the
first time, the right of all classes to be represented in Parliament was
permanently established. The barons (the English nobility) and the
Bishops and other high ranking members of the clergy joined together as the
“Lords Temporal and Spiritual” to form the House of Lords. Two knights from
every shire (county) and two burgesses from every town or borough were also
summoned, and these freemen or “commoners” joined together to form the House
of Commons. “What concerns all should be approved by all.” These
words appeared in the writs (written orders in the form of letters) sent out
by Edward when he summoned the Model Parliament.
Taxation to support Edward’s wars concerned all. The Model Parliament
granted him that monetary aid, and from this time forward it was understood
that the King could not levy a tax without the approval of Parliament. Here
too was the birth of the constitutional principle around which the Americans
rallied five centuries later: “No Taxation without
Representation.”
Gradually this “power of the purse” passed into the hands of
members of the House of Commons. Under the American Constitution, as
the English, the power to initiate tax revenue measures is considered to be
so important that only the lower houses may propose money bills. “All bills
for raising Revenue,” states Article I, Section 7 of the Constitution,
“shall originate in the House of Representatives.”
15th century the people of England chose individuals from their own number
to represent them in the House of Commons, whose members were privileged
against interference or even ordinary arrest. |
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Philosophy |
A representation of the
people in one assembly being obtained, a question arises whether all the
powers of government, legislative, executive, and judicial, shall be left in
this body? I think a people cannot be long free, nor ever happy, whose
government is in one Assembly. My reasons for this opinion are as follow.
1. A single Assembly is liable to all the vices, follies and frailties of an
individual. Subject to fits of humour, starts of passion, flights of
enthusiasm, partialities of prejudice, and consequently productive of hasty
results and absurd judgments: And all these errors ought to be corrected and
defects supplied by some controuling power.
2. A single Assembly is apt to be avaricious, and in time will not scruple
to exempt itself from burthens which it will lay, without compunction, on
its constituents.
3. A single Assembly is apt to grow ambitious, and after a time will not
hesitate to vote itself perpetual. This was one fault of the long
parliament, but more remarkably of Holland, whose Assembly first voted
themselves from annual to septennial, then for life, and after a course of
years, that all vacancies happening by death, or otherwise, should be filled
by themselves, without any application to constituents at all.
4. A Representative Assembly, altho' extremely well qualified, and
absolutely necessary as a branch of the legislature, is unfit to exercise
the executive power, for want of two essential properties, secrecy and
dispatch.
5. A Representative Assembly is still less qualified for the judicial power;
because it is too numerous, too slow, and too little skilled in the laws.
6. Because a single Assembly, possessed of all the powers of government,
would make arbitrary laws for their own interest, execute all laws
arbitrarily for their own interest, and adjudge all controversies in their
own favour.
But shall the whole power of legislation rest in one Assembly? Most of the
foregoing reasons apply equally to prove that the legislative power ought to
be more complex--to which we may add, that if the legislative power is
wholly in one Assembly, and the executive in another, or in a single person,
these two powers will oppose and enervate upon each other, until the contest
shall end in war, and the whole power, legislative and executive, be usurped
by the strongest.
The judicial power, in such case, could not mediate, or hold the balance
between the two contending powers, because the legislative would undermine
it. And this shews the necessity too, of giving the executive power a
negative upon the legislative, otherwise this will be continually
encroaching upon that.
To avoid these dangers let a [distinct] Assembly be constituted, as a
mediator between the two extreme branches of the legislature, that which
represents the people and that which is vested with the executive power.
John Adams, Thoughts on Government, Apr 1776
Source:
The Founders' Constitution |
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Examination |
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Inherited Powers
Each house of Congress possesses additional powers that are not always
clearly specified in the Constitution. These are powers inherited from the
English Parliament and the early State legislatures, and thus are called
“inherited” powers. Under certain circumstances, for example, each house can
exclude persons from its membership. Other important inherited powers
include the power to conduct investigations, to subpoena witnesses, and to
judge the qualifications of members.
Taken together, the
powers of Congress may be classified as:
1) enumerated or delegated, as seen in Article I,
Section 8;
2) implied, as seen again in Article I, Section 8;
3) prohibited, as seen in Article I, Section 9; and
4) inherited, as seen in Article I, Section 5
These powers can be further subdivided as exclusive and
concurrent. An example of an exclusive power of Congress is the power to
declare war. Thus the President cannot, on his own authority, declare
war against another country, though he can, as Commander-in-Chief of the
armed forces, participate with Congress in making war against a
foreign enemy. The war-making power is, in fact, a concurrent power,
one that Congress shares with the President. Congress also shares certain
powers with the States. Its power to levy an income tax, for example, is a
concurrent power because the States can also levy such a tax.
All other powers are commonly called reserved or residual
powers. These are the unspecified powers that the people or the States
did not delegate or surrender to Congress or the general government, and
reserved to themselves. |
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Self Evaluation |
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Section 2
The House of Representatives shall be composed of Members chosen every
second Year by the People of the several States, and the Electors in each
State shall have the Qualifications requisite for Electors of the most
numerous Branch of the State Legislature.
No Person shall be a Representative who shall not have attained to the Age
of twenty five Years, and been seven Years a Citizen of the United States,
and who shall not, when elected, be an Inhabitant of that State in which he
shall be chosen.
Representatives and direct Taxes shall be apportioned among the several
States which may be included within this Union, according to their
respective Numbers, which shall be determined by adding to the whole Number
of free Persons, including those bound to Service for a Term of Years, and
excluding Indians not taxed, three fifths of all other Persons. The actual
Enumeration shall be made within three Years after the first Meeting of the
Congress of the United States, and within every subsequent Term of ten
Years, in such Manner as they shall by Law direct. The Number of
Representatives shall not exceed one for every thirty Thousand, but each
State shall have at Least one Representative; and until such enumeration
shall be made, the State of New Hampshire shall be entitled to chuse three,
Massachusetts eight, Rhode-Island and Providence Plantations one,
Connecticut five, New-York six, New Jersey four, Pennsylvania eight,
Delaware one, Maryland six, Virginia ten, North Carolina five, South
Carolina five, and Georgia three.
When vacancies happen in the Representation from any State, the Executive
Authority thereof shall issue Writs of Election to fill such Vacancies.
The House of Representatives shall chuse their Speaker and other Officers;
and shall have the sole Power of Impeachment. |
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History |
Impeachments were known in Athens. They were
prosecuted for great and publick offences, by which the commonwealth was
brought into danger. They were not referred to any court of justice, but
were prosecuted before the popular assembly, or before the senate of five
hundred.
Among the ancient Germans also, we discover the traces of impeachments: for
we are informed by Tacitus, in his masterly account of the manners of that
people, that it was allowed to present accusations, and to prosecute capital
offences, before the general assembly of the nation.
An impeachment is described, by the law of England, to be, a presentment to
the most high and supreme court of criminal jurisdiction, by the most solemn
grand inquest of the kingdom. James Wilson, Legislative Department,
Lectures on Law, 1791
Source
The Founders' Constitution |
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Philosophy |
Who are to be the electors of the Foederal
Representatives? Not the rich more than the poor; not the learned more than
the ignorant; not the haughty heirs of distinguished names, more than the
humble sons of obscure and unpropitious fortune. The electors are to be the
great body of the people of the United States. They are to be the same who
exercise the right in every State of electing the correspondent branch of
the Legislature of the State.
Who are to be the objects of popular choice? Every citizen whose merit may
recommend him to the esteem and confidence of his country. No qualification
of wealth, of birth, of religious faith, or of civil profession, is
permitted to fetter the judgment or disappoint the inclination of the
people. James Madison, Federalist, no. 57, 384--90 |
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Examination |
They knew the inestimable value of the house of commons, as a
component branch of the British parliament; and they believed, that it had
at all times furnished the best security against the oppressions of the
crown, and the aristocracy. While the power of taxation, of revenue, and of
supplies, remained in the hands of a popular branch, it was difficult for
usurpation to exist for any length of time without check; and prerogative
must yield to that necessity, which controlled at once the sword and the
purse. No reasoning, therefore, was necessary to satisfy the American people
of the advantages of a house of representatives, which should emanate
directly from themselves; which should guard their interests, support their
rights, express their opinions, make known their wants, redress their
grievances, and introduce a pervading popular influence throughout all the
operations of the government. Experience, as well as theory, had settled it
in their minds, as a fundamental principle of a free government, and
especially of a republican government, that no laws ought to be passed
without the co-operation and consent of the representatives of the people;
and that these representatives should be chosen by themselves without the
intervention of any other functionaries to intercept, or vary their
responsibility. Joseph Story, Commentaries on the Constitution of the
United States, 1833
Source
The Founders' Constitution |
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Self Evaluation |
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Section 3
The Senate of the United States shall be composed of two Senators from each
State, chosen by the Legislature thereof for six Years; and each Senator
shall have one Vote.
Immediately after they shall be assembled in Consequence of the first
Election, they shall be divided as equally as may be into three Classes. The
Seats of the Senators of the first Class shall be vacated at the Expiration
of the second Year, of the second Class at the Expiration of the fourth
Year, and of the third Class at the Expiration of the sixth Year, so that
one third may be chosen every second Year; and if Vacancies happen by
Resignation, or otherwise, during the Recess of the Legislature of any
State, the Executive thereof may make temporary Appointments until the next
Meeting of the Legislature, which shall then fill such Vacancies.
No Person shall be a Senator who shall not have attained to the Age of
thirty Years, and been nine Years a Citizen of the United States, and who
shall not, when elected, be an Inhabitant of that State for which he shall
be chosen.
The Vice President of the United States shall be President of the Senate,
but shall have no Vote, unless they be equally divided.
The Senate shall chuse their other Officers, and also a President pro
tempore, in the Absence of the Vice President, or when he shall exercise the
Office of President of the United States.
The Senate shall have the sole Power to try all Impeachments. When sitting
for that Purpose, they shall be on Oath or Affirmation. When the President
of the United States is tried, the Chief Justice shall preside: And no
Person shall be convicted without the Concurrence of two thirds of the
Members present.
Judgment in Cases of Impeachment shall not extend further than to removal
from Office, and disqualification to hold and enjoy any Office of honor,
Trust or Profit under the United States: but the Party convicted shall
nevertheless be liable and subject to Indictment, Trial, Judgment and
Punishment, according to Law. |
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History |
It is said yt. we threw open our
Doors--invited the oppressed of all Countries to come & find an Asylum in
America--This is true we invited them to come and worship in our Temple but
we never invited them to become Priests at our Altar--We shd. cherish the
love of our country--This is a wholesome prejudice and is in favor of our
Country--Foreigners will not learn our laws & Constitution under 14
yrs.--7yrs must be applied to learn to be a Shoe Maker--14 at least are
necessary to learn to be an Amer. Legislator--Again--that period will be
requisite to eradicate the Affections of Education and native Attachments
G Morris, Records of the Federal Convention
Source
The Founders' Constitution |
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Philosophy |
There is no novelty in the appointment of a
person to preside, as speaker, who is not a constituent member of the body,
over which he is to preside. In the house of lords in England the presiding
officer is the lord chancellor, or lord keeper of the great seal, or other
person appointed by the king's commission; and if none such be so appointed,
then it is said, that the lords may elect. But it is by no means necessary,
that the person appointed by the king should be a peer of the realm or lord
of parliament. Nor has this appointment by the king ever been complained of,
as a grievance, nor has it operated with inconvenience or oppression in
practice. It is on the contrary deemed an important advantage, both to the
officer, and to the house of peers, adding dignity and weight to the former,
and securing great legal ability and talent in aid of the latter. This
consideration alone might have had some influence in the convention. The
vice president being himself chosen by the states, might well be deemed, in
point of age, character, and dignity, worthy to preside over the
deliberations of the senate, in which the states were all assembled and
represented. His impartiality in the discharge of its duties might be fairly
presumed; and the employment would not only bring his character in review
before the public; but enable him to justify the public confidence, by
performing his public functions with independence, and firmness, and sound
discretion. A citizen, who was deemed worthy of being one of the competitors
for the presidency, could scarcely fail of being distinguished by private
virtues, by comprehensive acquirements, and by eminent services. In all
questions before the senate he might safely be appealed to, as a fit arbiter
upon an equal division, in which case alone he is entrusted with a vote.
§ 736. But the strong motive for this appointment was of another sort,
founded upon state jealousy, and state equality in the senate. If the
speaker of the senate was to be chosen from its own members, the state, upon
whom the choice would fall, might possess either more or less, than its due
share of influence. If the speaker were not allowed to vote, except where
there was an equal division, independent of his own vote, then the state
might lose its own voice; if he were allowed to give his vote, and also a
casting vote, then the state might, in effect, possess a double vote. Either
alternative would of itself present a predicament sufficiently embarrassing.
On the other hand, if no casting vote were allowed in any case, then the
indecision and inconvenience might be very prejudicial to the public
interests, in case of an equality of votes. It might give rise to dangerous
feuds, or intrigues, and create sectional and state agitations. The smaller
states might well suppose, that their interests were less secure, and less
guarded, than they ought to be. Under such circumstances, the vice president
would seem to be the most fit arbiter to decide, because he would be the
representative, not of one state only, but of all; and must be presumed to
feel a lively interest in promoting all measures for the public good. This
reasoning appears to have been decisive in the convention, and satisfactory
to the people. It establishes, that there was a manifest propriety in making
the arrangement conducive to the harmony of the states, and the dignity of
the general government. And as the senate possesses the power to make rules
for its own proceedings, there is little danger, that there can ever arise
any abuse of the presiding power. The danger, if any, is rather the other
way, that the presiding power will be either silently weakened, or openly
surrendered, so as to leave the office little more, than the barren honour
of a place, without influence and without action.
Joseph Story, Commentaries on the
Constitution, 1833
Source
The Founders' Constitution |
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Examination |
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Five pounds in the Senate has an equal voice with fifty, and
about five hundred thousand of the inhabitants the same number of votes with
the remaining three millions. Where then is the probability the rights of
the people will find equal security? Is it not demonstrable that your
burthens will be great in proportion as your influence in that body that
imposes them is small? As it respects this Commonwealth [of Massachusetts],
infinitely better would be our situation in a representation in the British
Parliament. The terms offered us by our enemies to place us as we stood in
1763, bear no comparison in their consequences, to those which would flow
from the exercise of the powers of this Government by the Senate, as now
constructed. If the same proportion in numbers and property had been
observed in this Branch as in the House of Representatives (and no reason
why it was not hath yet appeared, excepting what the celebrated Southern
gentleman is pleased to term a "necessary compromise between contending
interests") however successful they might be hereafter in arrogating all
the powers of government to themselves, or however severe in executing them,
still one gleam of hope with the spirit of consolation would be found in the
breast of the subject, that his grievances were proportionate to those of
his neighbours; but in the present case, even this satisfaction is denied
him--the uncertainty is not left him--his reason instanter convinces him it
is not so.
John DeWitt NO. 4
Anti-Federalist Papers |
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Self Evaluation |
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Section 4
The Times, Places and Manner of holding Elections for Senators and
Representatives, shall be prescribed in each State by the Legislature
thereof; but the Congress may at any time by Law make or alter such
Regulations, except as to the Places of chusing Senators.
The Congress shall assemble at least once in every Year, and such Meeting
shall be on the first Monday in December, unless they shall by Law appoint a
different Day. |
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History |
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"It indisputably appears, that
parliaments, or general councils, are coeval with the kingdom itself. How
those parliaments were constituted and composed, is another question, which
has been matter of great dispute among our learned antiquarians; and,
particularly, whether the commons were summoned at all; or, if summoned, at
what period they began to form a distinct assembly. But it is not my
intention here to enter into controversies of this sort. I hold it
sufficient that it is generally agreed, that in the main the constitution of
parliament, as it now stands, was marked out so long ago as the seventeenth
year of king John, A.D. 1215, in the great charter granted by that
prince; wherein he promises to summon all arch-bishops, bishops, abbots,
earls, and greater barons, personally; and all other tenants in chief under
the crown, by the sheriff and bailiffs; to meet at a certain place, with
forty days notice, to assess aids and scutages when necessary."
William Blackstone, Commentaries |
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Philosophy |
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"He has called together legislative bodies at places unusual, uncomfortable,
and distant from the depository of their public Records, for the sole
purpose of fatiguing them into compliance with his measures.--He has
dissolved Representative Houses repeatedly, for opposing with manly firmness
his invasions on the rights of the people.--He has refused for a long time,
after such dissolutions, to cause others to be elected; whereby the
Legislative powers, incapable of Annihilation, have returned to the People
at large for their exercise; the State remaining in the mean time exposed to
all the dangers of invasion from without, and convulsions within." The
Declaration of Independence |
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Examination |
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"It
cannot be supposed that any state will consent to fix the election at
inconvenient seasons and places in any other state lest she herself should
hereafter experience the same inconvenience; but it is absolutely necessary
that Congress should have this superintending power, lest, by the intrigues
of a ruling faction in a state, the members of the House of Representatives
should not really represent the people of the state, and lest the same
faction, through partial state views, should altogether refuse to send
representatives of the people to the general government."
Charles
Cotesworth Pinckney, South Carolina House of Representatives |
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Self Evaluation |
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Section 5
Each House shall be the Judge of the Elections, Returns and Qualifications
of its own Members, and a Majority of each shall constitute a Quorum to do
Business; but a smaller Number may adjourn from day to day, and may be
authorized to compel the Attendance of absent Members, in such Manner, and
under such Penalties as each House may provide.
Each House may determine the Rules of its Proceedings, punish its Members
for disorderly Behaviour, and, with the Concurrence of two thirds, expel a
Member.
Each House shall keep a Journal of its Proceedings, and from time to time
publish the same, excepting such Parts as may in their Judgment require
Secrecy; and the Yeas and Nays of the Members of either House on any
question shall, at the Desire of one fifth of those Present, be entered on
the Journal.
Neither House, during the Session of Congress, shall, without the Consent of
the other, adjourn for more than three days, nor to any other Place than
that in which the two Houses shall be sitting. |
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History |
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"The congress of the united states
shall have power to adjourn to any time within the year, and to any place
within the united states, so that no period of adjournment be for a longer
duration than the space of six Months, and shall publish the Journal of
their proceedings monthly, except such parts thereof relating to treaties,
alliances or military operations, as in their judgment require secrecy; and
the yeas and nays of the delegates of each state on any question shall be
entered on the Journal, when it is desired by any delegate; and the
delegates of a state, or any of them, at his or their request shall be
furnished with a transcript of the said Journal, except such parts as are
above excepted, to lay before the legislatures of the several states."
The Articles of Confederation |
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Philosophy |
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Examination |
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Self Evaluation |
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Section 6
The Senators and Representatives shall receive a Compensation for their
Services, to be ascertained by Law, and paid out of the Treasury of the
United States. They shall in all Cases, except Treason, Felony and Breach of
the Peace, be privileged from Arrest during their Attendance at the Session
of their respective Houses, and in going to and returning from the same; and
for any Speech or Debate in either House, they shall not be questioned in
any other Place.
No Senator or Representative shall, during the Time for which he was
elected, be appointed to any civil Office under the Authority of the United
States, which shall have been created, or the Emoluments whereof shall have
been encreased during such time; and no Person holding any Office under the
United States, shall be a Member of either House during his Continuance in
Office. |
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History |
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Philosophy |
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Examination |
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Self Evaluation |
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Section 7
All Bills for raising Revenue shall originate in the House of
Representatives; but the Senate may propose or concur with Amendments as on
other Bills.
Every Bill which shall have passed the House of Representatives and the
Senate, shall, before it become a Law, be presented to the President of the
United States: If he approve he shall sign it, but if not he shall return
it, with his Objections to that House in which it shall have originated, who
shall enter the Objections at large on their Journal, and proceed to
reconsider it. If after such Reconsideration two thirds of that House shall
agree to pass the Bill, it shall be sent, together with the Objections, to
the other House, by which it shall likewise be reconsidered, and if approved
by two thirds of that House, it shall become a Law. But in all such Cases
the Votes of both Houses shall be determined by yeas and Nays, and the Names
of the Persons voting for and against the Bill shall be entered on the
Journal of each House respectively. If any Bill shall not be returned by the
President within ten Days (Sundays excepted) after it shall have been
presented to him, the Same shall be a Law, in like Manner as if he had
signed it, unless the Congress by their Adjournment prevent its Return, in
which Case it shall not be a Law.
Every Order, Resolution, or Vote to which the Concurrence of the Senate and
House of Representatives may be necessary (except on a question of
Adjournment) shall be presented to the President of the United States; and
before the Same shall take Effect, shall be approved by him, or being
disapproved by him, shall be repassed by two thirds of the Senate and House
of Representatives, according to the Rules and Limitations prescribed in the
Case of a Bill. |
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History |
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Philosophy |
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Examination |
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Self Evaluation |
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Section 8
The Congress shall have Power To lay and collect Taxes,
Duties, Imposts and Excises, to pay the Debts and provide for the common
Defence and general Welfare of the United States; but all Duties, Imposts
and Excises shall be uniform throughout the United States;
To borrow Money on the credit of the United States;
To regulate Commerce with foreign Nations, and among the several States, and
with the Indian Tribes;
To establish an uniform Rule of Naturalization, and uniform Laws on the
subject of Bankruptcies throughout the United States;
To coin Money, regulate the Value thereof, and of foreign Coin, and fix the
Standard of Weights and Measures;
To provide for the Punishment of counterfeiting the Securities and current
Coin of the United States;
To establish Post Offices and post Roads;
To promote the Progress of Science and useful Arts, by securing for limited
Times to Authors and Inventors the exclusive Right to their respective
Writings and Discoveries;
To constitute Tribunals inferior to the supreme Court;
To define and punish Piracies and Felonies committed on the high Seas, and
Offences against the Law of Nations;
To declare War, grant Letters of Marque and Reprisal, and make Rules
concerning Captures on Land and Water;
To raise and support Armies, but no Appropriation of Money to that Use shall
be for a longer Term than two Years;
To provide and maintain a Navy;
To make Rules for the Government and Regulation of the land and naval
Forces;
To provide for calling forth the Militia to execute the Laws of the Union,
suppress Insurrections and repel Invasions;
To provide for organizing, arming, and disciplining, the Militia, and for
governing such Part of them as may be employed in the Service of the United
States, reserving to the States respectively, the Appointment of the
Officers, and the Authority of training the Militia according to the
discipline prescribed by Congress;
To exercise exclusive Legislation in all Cases whatsoever, over such
District (not exceeding ten Miles square) as may, by Cession of particular
States, and the Acceptance of Congress, become the Seat of the Government of
the United States, and to exercise like Authority over all Places purchased
by the Consent of the Legislature of the State in which the Same shall be,
for the Erection of Forts, Magazines, Arsenals, dock-Yards, and other
needful Buildings;--And
To make all Laws which shall be necessary and proper for carrying into
Execution the foregoing Powers, and all other Powers vested by this
Constitution in the Government of the United States, or in any Department or
Officer thereof. |
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History |
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Philosophy |
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Examination |
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The Necessary and Proper
Clause
The Necessary and Proper Clause expands the enumerated powers of Congress,
and for that reason is also referred to as the “elastic clause.” But the
clause does not give Congress the implied power to make laws for any purpose
whatever—only for the purpose of executing its enumerated powers and “all
other powers vested by this Constitution in the Government of the United
States or in any department or officer thereof,” meaning the President and
the Federal courts. Congress’ implied powers, therefore, are not limited to
the execution of its own enumerated powers. By virtue of this “all other
powers” provision, Congress has the implied power to share in the
responsibilities of other departments. (Madison’s blurry lines between the
branches of government)
The War Power Clause
Gives Congress
the right to declare war, to set the rules of war, and to raise and support
armies. The initiation of armed hostilities should be called up by the
concurrence of the President and both Houses of Congress. The reason is that
most of the founding fathers did not want lives to be shed on the decision
of a single individual. Hamilton, however, wanted the President to have
sole commander-in-chief powers who merely asked for the advice of the
Senate. Others thought this made the President a King. The compromise
solution was to allow the President to repel sudden attacks without
Congressional action. Presidents must inform Congress of military action in
the absence of a declaration of war, and Congress can approve actions short
of all-out war, but only Congress can stamp an action as an act of war. The
order of the President can initiate hostile action and commit troops abroad
in furtherance of national interests, but Congress can set cut-off dates for
when those troops must be withdrawn. Congress also controls the drafting of
service personnel, the age at which soldiers must be, military
compensations, and the system of military justice. Military courts are not
Article III courts but agencies established under Article I. Military law
supersedes Constitutional Law in an active Theater of military operations.
Upon a declaration of war, enemy property within the United States is
subject to immediate confiscation without 4th, 5th, and 6th Amendment
rights, and it is immaterial if that property belongs to an alien, a
neutral, or even to a citizen. Citizens cannot be made subject to military
(martial) law except when civil law is impossible to maintain, however,
curfews can be established to prevent espionage and sabotage. The United
States is not responsible for any injuries, damages, or destruction of
property in military operations, except in those cases where the property of
loyal citizens was taken for national defense.
Source
Constitutional Structure |
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Section 9
The Migration or Importation of such Persons as any of the States now
existing shall think proper to admit, shall not be prohibited by the
Congress prior to the Year one thousand eight hundred and eight, but a Tax
or duty may be imposed on such Importation, not exceeding ten dollars for
each Person.
The Privilege of the Writ of Habeas Corpus shall not be suspended, unless
when in Cases of Rebellion or Invasion the public Safety may require it.
No Bill of Attainder or ex post facto Law shall be passed.
No Capitation, or other direct, Tax shall be laid, unless in Proportion to
the Census or enumeration herein before directed to be taken.
No Tax or Duty shall be laid on Articles exported from any State.
No Preference shall be given by any Regulation of Commerce or Revenue to the
Ports of one State over those of another; nor shall Vessels bound to, or
from, one State, be obliged to enter, clear, or pay Duties in another.
No Money shall be drawn from the Treasury, but in Consequence of
Appropriations made by Law; and a regular Statement and Account of the
Receipts and Expenditures of all public Money shall be published from time
to time.
No Title of Nobility shall be granted by the United States: And no Person
holding any Office of Profit or Trust under them, shall, without the Consent
of the Congress, accept of any present, Emolument, Office, or Title, of any
kind whatever, from any King, Prince, or foreign State. |
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Antislavery delegates reluctantly agreed to a constitutional
provision that would forbid Congress from interfering with the importation
of slaves until the year 1808, and would permit a Federal tax on such
importation of not more than ten dollars per slave. The exemption from
Federal interference was limited to “the States now existing” and did not
apply to territories or new States entering the Union. |
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Section 10
No State shall enter into any Treaty, Alliance, or Confederation; grant
Letters of Marque and Reprisal; coin Money; emit Bills of Credit; make any
Thing but gold and silver Coin a Tender in Payment of Debts; pass any Bill
of Attainder, ex post facto Law, or Law impairing the Obligation of
Contracts, or grant any Title of Nobility.
No State shall, without the Consent of the Congress, lay any Imposts or
Duties on Imports or Exports, except what may be absolutely necessary for
executing it's inspection Laws: and the net Produce of all Duties and
Imposts, laid by any State on Imports or Exports, shall be for the Use of
the Treasury of the United States; and all such Laws shall be subject to the
Revision and Controul of the Congress.
No State shall, without the Consent of Congress, lay any Duty of Tonnage,
keep Troops, or Ships of War in time of Peace, enter into any Agreement or
Compact with another State, or with a foreign Power, or engage in War,
unless actually invaded, or in such imminent Danger as will not admit of
delay. |
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